Guest Blogged by John Gideon, with additional reporting by Brad
Friedman

vspace=3 border=0>"We can take a version of Sequoia's software program and
modify it to do something different --- like appear to count votes, but really
move them from one candidate to another. And it can be programmed to do that
only on Tuesdays in November, and at any other time. You can't detect it,"
Princeton's Professor of Computer Science Andrew Appel href="http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?/base/news-11/1171172999136630.xml&coll=1&thispage=1"
target=_blank>explains in New Jersey's Star-Ledger today
^[1].

Like Diebold's
touch-screen machines before them ^[2], Sequoia's voting machines
have now been found to be hackable in seconds by a Princeton University
professor who says the systems could be "easily...rigged to throw an election."
Someone may wish to let the folks in Riverside County, CA, know since County
Supervisors there target=_blank>recently issued ^[3] a "thousand to one" bet that
their Sequoia voting systems couldn't be manipulated.

src="http://www.BradBlog.com/Images/SequoiaVotingSystems_NumberOneinTesting_small.gif"
align=right vspace=3 border=0>In the same report, it was revealed that an
attorney has filed suit, claiming the Sequoia AVC Advantage Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) voting machines used in 18 of New Jersey's 21 counties were
never reviewed by the state before they were improperly certified for use and
that Princeton's Appel was able to acquire five Sequoia voting machines only for
$86. The same machines were recently purchased by the state for $8,000
apiece.

According to the Star-Ledger...

align=left vspace=3 border=0>Venetis argues that the state certification is in
violation of NJ state law which says such systems must "correctly register and
accurately count all votes cast," be "of durable construction" to be used
"safely, efficiently, and accurately."

The lack of documentation and testing, however, is hardly the only problem,
as reported by the paper today. "Had the machines been tested," Election
Integrity advocates have found, "they would have proved to be a hacker's
dream."

Princeton Computer Science Professor Andrew Appel revealed that he bought 5
of the Advantage voting machines from an on-line government equipment
clearinghouse for a total of $86. Virtually identical machines were bought in
2005 by Essex County New Jersey for $8,000 per machine.

"Appel had to submit only minimal personal information and a cashier's check
to close the deal," the Star-Ledger reports. He and his team then put the
5 machines to good use...

And what does Sequoia systems vaunted crisis-management team have to say for
itself?

src="http://www.BradBlog.com/Images/SequoiaMachinesUnguarded_RiversideCty_TovashalElementary_110306.jpg"
align=right vspace=3 border=0>

Appel counters:

Of course, this is not the first time that Sequoia's "tamperproof products"
have been found to be highly tamperable.

In March of 2006, just prior to the Pennsylvania's Primary Election, Carnegie
Mellon University's Dr. Michael Shamos, --- a long-time advocate of electronic,
touch-screen voting --- target=_blank>accidentally "hacked" a Sequoia system ^[4] during a
demonstration of the system's "invulnerability" to tampering. Shamos was in
charge of testing systems for the state.

As well, last November, just days before the General Election, href="http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3714" target=_blank>in a stunning report by The
BRAD BLOG ^[5] we revealed the "yellow button" on the back of
every Sequoia touch-screen machine which, when pressed once in a simple
sequence, places the machine into "manual mode" allowing anybody to cast as many
votes as they wish on that machine.

In Riverside County, CA just before the end of last year, County Supervisor
Jeff Stone challenged Election Integrity advocates during a href="http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3885" target=_blank>public, video-taped
meeting ^[6] to bring a hacker in to try and manipulate the
county's Sequoia voting systems. Riverside was the first county in the country
to move to touch-screen voting in the late 90's. Election Integrity advocates on
the ground there have been challenging that decision ever since.

Though noted computer security expert Harri Hursti, who has hacked several
Diebold systems, quickly target=_blank>agreed to meet ^[7] Stone's "thousand to one"
challenge, Stone has been balking ever since. So far, href="http://www.bradblog.com/?p=4043" target=_blank>he has failed to allow
Hursti ^[8] and the Election Integrity advocates from DFA-Temecula
Valley to take him up on his ill-considered challenge, citing unsubstantiated
concerns about state law and universally attempting to establish "ground rules"
which have been target=_blank>dismissed as unrealistic ^[9] by both Hursti and a
number of internationally recognized computer scientists and security
experts.

We suspect there will be much fallout from this latest chapter in New Jersey.
Stay tuned...